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Now I Know My “ACBs”: The Right to 
Literacy Following an Incremental Path 
Gregory J. O’Neill  
15 U. MASS. L. REV. 292  
ABSTRACT 
It is a tragic irony that a nation with enormous wealth will not provide the most basic 
of education rights to its citizens. Despite continual judicial and legislative measures 
to ensure access to education, or a facsimile thereof, no judicial or legislative body 
has taken the step to ensure that literacy is a fundamental right for the citizens of the 
United States. The issue has been, and continues to be, presented to both Congress 
and the courts. While Congress has passed legislation to some degree, both 
institutions have largely failed to ensure the population receives the fundamental 
right of literacy. 
There is not much pushback to the argument that education and literacy are 
important. But questions remain: How much education is necessary to claim that 
literacy is a right? Is literacy important enough to shine brightly on the national 
consciousness? 
AUTHOR’S NOTE 
B.A. Amherst College; J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Massachusetts School of 
Law. The author owes a great deal to Professors Jeremiah Ho and Frances Rudko for 
their feedback and guidance; without which, this paper would still be a fledgling 
idea, spinning around in his head. The author would like to acknowledge Mary Brigh 
Lavery and the entire UMass Law Review team for their tireless work. The author 
thanks his friends and family, especially Jeni, whose support gave him the fortitude 
to take on the challenge of law school, at this point in his life. Finally, the author 
would be remiss if he did not mention his partner in crime, the lawyer-dog, Harley. 
  
2020 Now I Know My "ACBs" 293 
 
LITERACY IS FUNDAMENTAL ...................................................................... 294 
I. THE HISTORY OF LITERACY & ITS IMPORTANCE ............................... 295 
A. History ............................................................................................ 295 
B. Literacy and Freedom of Expression ............................................. 300 
C. Literacy and the Right to Exercise Political Will ........................... 301 
D. Opposition to Literacy as a Right ................................................... 302 
E. Literacy is Testable, Justiciable, & Remediable ............................ 304 
II. INCREMENTALISM ............................................................................... 306 
A. Background & Theory .................................................................... 306 
B. Opposition to Incrementalism as a Path Forward .......................... 308 
C. Examples of Incremental Policymaking ........................................ 308 
1. Marriage Equality ...................................................................... 308 
2. Marijuana Legalization .............................................................. 314 
III. AN INCREMENTAL PATH FOR LITERACY ............................................ 317 
A. Rejection from the Courts Is a Blessing ......................................... 317 
B. The Status of the States .................................................................. 318 
C. Moving Forward by Taking Small Steps ....................................... 319 
NEXT TIME WON’T YOU SING WITH ME .................................................... 322 
 
  
294 UMass Law Review v. 15 | 292 
LITERACY IS FUNDAMENTAL 
Literacy is a fundamental requirement for the exercise of effective 
citizenship and the foundational building-blocks of a democratic 
society, yet it is not a right. How can this be? More importantly, how 
can it become one? “[B]asic literacy, is essential for a well-functioning 
democracy, and enhances citizenship and community.”1 Conversely, a 
lack of literacy has a negative impact on community and societal 
stability. “Illiteracy is perhaps the strongest common denominator 
among individuals in corrections.”2 Rates of literacy and education are 
directly correlated to crime, public assistance, and “higher payback in 
the form of sales, property, and state income taxes.”3 Education levels 
also have a “strong and significant” effect on health.4 
Studies demonstrate that illiteracy negatively impacts academic, 
personal, and professional achievement, as well as mental health and 
social/emotional well-being. A child who is not reading proficiently in 
third grade is four times more likely to fail to graduate from high 
school on time.5 As for the students who do graduate from high school 
with poor literacy skills, they are unprepared and ill-equipped to enter 
the workforce.6 
This Note will argue that a right to literacy is a fundamental 
requirement for a citizenry to meaningfully exercise their rights. 
Additionally, it will be posited that since the federal system is 
disinclined to promote the right to literacy, an appropriate path may be 
through the lens of the theory of incrementalism. By following similar 
issues that gained national prominence after starting as a hodgepodge 
of state laws, this Note will argue that it is possible to thrust literacy 
 
1 Claudia Goldin, A Brief History of Education in the United States 1 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Historical Working Paper No. 119, 1999). 
2 William Drakeford, The Impact of an Intensive Program to Increase the 
Literacy Skills of Youth Confined to Juvenile Corrections, 53 J. CORRECTIONAL 
EDUC. 139, 139 (2002). 
3 Michael Hout, Social and Economic Returns to College Education in the United 
States, 38 ANN. REV. SOC. 379, 392 (2012). 
4 Adriana Lleras-Muney, The Relationship Between Education and Adult 
Mortality in the United States, 72 REV. ECON. STUD. 189, 189 (2005). 
5 DONALD J. HERNANDEZ, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: HOW THIRD-GRADE READING 
SKILLS AND POVERTY INFLUENCE HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION 3 (2011), 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED518818.pdf [https://perma.cc/JW7C-K2TQ]. 
6 See generally Bob Wise, High Schools at the Tipping Point, EDUC. LEADERSHIP, 
May 2008, at 8. 
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onto the national stage to ensure equitable enforcement and, some may 
argue, moral equality. 
Part I focuses on the history of education and literacy through a 
judicial and social lens. Part I also analyzes the crucial role that 
literacy plays in the preservation and fulfillment of other constitutional 
rights. Part II evaluates the theory of incrementalism, both its 
background and how it has applied to previous issues. Part III 
concludes with an analysis of how incrementalism could promulgate 
literacy, as a fundamental right, into the national consciousness. 
I. THE HISTORY OF LITERACY & ITS IMPORTANCE 
A. History 
In 1642, Massachusetts Bay Colony passed the first law, in what 
would eventually become the United States, which required that 
children be taught to read and write.7 The English Puritans who 
founded Massachusetts believed that the well-being of individuals, 
along with the success of the colony, depended on a literate citizenry 
to read both the Bible and the laws of the land that governed them.8 
Many of the founding fathers regarded education and literacy as 
essential foundations to a healthy democracy. Thomas Jefferson 
regarded the freedom of the press as important, but not enough, on its 
own, to guarantee a healthy democracy.9 In 1816, Jefferson wrote to 
Charles Yancey, a prominent Virginia legislator, “[w]here the press is 
free, and every man is able to read, all is safe.”10 John Adams, too, 
saw the need for a quality education and—sixty-seven years before the 
first law mandating compulsory education in the United States—he 
argued in favor of a system of publicly funded education: 
[T]he Whole People must take upon themselvs the Education of 
the Whole People and must be willing to bear the expences of it. 
 
7 See William E. Sparkman, The Legal Foundations of Public School Finance, 35 
B.C. L. REV. 569, 570 (1994). 
8 Id. “For example, the Massachusetts School Law of 1642, empowered town 
officials to hold all parents and masters accountable for their children’s ability 
‘to read and understand the principles of religion and the capitall lawes [sic] of 
this country’ by imposing ‘fines upon such as shall refuse to render such 
accounts.’” Id. (quoting 1 EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 393 (Sol Cohen ed. 1974)). 
9 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Colonel Charles Yancey (Jan. 6, 1816), in 11 
THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 493, 497 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905). 
10 Id. (emphasis added). 
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[T]here should not be a district of one Mile Square without a 
school in it, not founded by a Charitable individual but maintained 
at the expence of the People themselvs they must be taught to 
reverence themselvs instead of adoreing their servants their 
Generals Admirals Bishops and Statesmen [sic].11 
Additionally, the relationship between education and the peoples’ 
freedom to exercise political will was readily understood as crucial; as 
James Madison explained: “a people who mean to be their own 
Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge 
gives.”12 
More recently, in 1965, with the passage of President Johnson’s 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and its more well-known 
reauthorizations in 2001 and 2015, the federal government fully 
entrenched itself in the education of the nation’s children.13 However 
well-intentioned and effective these policies may be,14 a simple truth 
remains. None of these Acts of Congress have given the American 
people a right to literacy. 
 
11 Letter from John Adams to John Jebb (Sept. 10, 1785), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-17-02-0232 
[https://perma.cc/936B-DAPT]. 
12 THE COMPLETE MADISON: HIS BASIC WRITINGS 337 (Saul K. Padover ed., The 
Easton Press 1988). 
13 Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (“ESEA”), Pub. L. No. 89-10, 
79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). This Act 
provided federal funding to elementary and secondary education with particular 
emphasis on equal access to education, closing achievement gaps, and 
supporting impoverished children. Derek W. Black, Abandoning the Federal 
Role in Education: The Every Student Succeeds Act, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 
1317–21 (2017) [hereinafter Black, Abandoning the Federal Role in Education]. 
Additionally, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (“NCLB”) reauthorized 
ESEA and furthered federal control in public education by conditioning funding 
on testing, progress reports, and teacher qualifications. See Derek W. Black, The 
Congressional Failure to Enforce Equal Protection Through the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 313, 343–52 (2010). The Every 
Student Succeeds Act of 2015 (“ESSA”) replaced NCLB’s strict assessment 
protocols while reauthorizing ESEA’s federal role in public education. Black, 
Abandoning the Federal Role in Education at 1311–12. ESSA retained the 
standardized testing requirement but returned the power to determine the 
academic standards of the tests to the states. Id. 
14 An analysis of ESEA, NCLB, and ESSA’s effectiveness has been well debated 
and better left for another time. Notably, the teeth of the Acts—their 
accountability regulations—were knocked out in 2017. Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965, H.R.J. Res. 57, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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The Supreme Court has considered the education issue in some 
form or another, but it too has not found a constitutional right to 
literacy, or education for that matter.15 The seminal education decision 
in the nation’s history came in Brown v. Board of Education.16 The 
Brown Court mandated equal access to education and the end to the 
evil of segregation.17 While declaring education as “perhaps the most 
important function of state and local governments” and of great 
“importance . . . to our democratic society,” the Court stopped short of 
mandating education or holding that literacy was a right.18 The belief 
in the importance of education that underlies the holding in Brown has 
surfaced in other cases, but those cases have limited their decision to 
the scope of unconstitutional restrictions on access to education.19 
Other cases at the federal level have also failed to build upon the, 
albeit indirect, success of Brown, Plyler, and Davis in attempting to 
establish a right to education and/or literacy.20 
The Supreme Court has, in the past, been willing to recognize 
some affirmative rights, but a recent swing towards judicial restraint 
 
15 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33–35 (1973) 
(refusing to apply strict scrutiny where the system of school financing resulted 
in disproportionate expenses for children hailing from different districts). 
16 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, plaintiffs sought admission to the public schools 
of their respective communities. Id. at 487. Each were denied entry to schools 
that white children were allowed to attend. Id. at 488. They sought protection 
from discriminatory segregation under the protections afforded them by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 
17 Id. at 495. 
18 Id. at 493. 
19 See Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999) (holding that 
school boards may be liable to Title IX claims if pervasive harassment of 
students effectively bars their access to education); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 
230 (1982) (holding that children of illegal immigrants are entitled to access to 
education). 
20 See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 460 (1988) (rejecting the 
Plyler standard of heightened review); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285–86 
(1986) (comparing the holdings in Plyler and Rodriguez and concluding that 
without the designation of education as a fundamental right, the rational basis 
test would be used). See generally Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344, 368 
(E.D. Mich. 2018) (applying the rational basis test); Foster v. Tupelo Pub. Sch. 
Dist., 569 F. Supp. 2d 667, 674 (N.D. Miss. 2008) (applying the rational basis 
test). 
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has crippled its ability to cure the nation’s ills.21 The Court has, on 
several occasions, though often only in dicta or dissent, espoused the 
notion that education is a crucial element to the civic and economic 
health of the nation.22 However, coupled with the historic precedent of 
relegating educational policy to the states, the refusal to recognize a 
right to education or literacy, and the modern Court’s trend towards 
judicial restraint, it is unlikely that much or any headway can be made 
at the federal level to realize this right. 
Even if every state had the hypothetical duty to provide a 
Rodriguez-ian basic quantum of education,23 it would be a patchwork 
of disparate standards and uneven enforcement. As it stands, every 
state does have its own individual constitutional mandate, which—at a 
minimum—sets forth a system to provide a free public education.24 
The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights goes well beyond simply 
establishing a public education system and sets out a broad and wide-
ranging mandate for education in the Commonwealth: 
Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally 
among the body of the people, being necessary for the preservation 
of their rights and liberties; and as these depend on spreading the 
opportunities and advantages of education in the various parts of 
the country, and among the different orders of the people, it shall 
be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of 
this commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the 
 
21 See Ian Millhiser, What Happens to a Dream Deferred?: Cleansing the Taint of 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 55 DUKE L.J. 405, 407 
(2005). 
22 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 620, 629 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(Education is “inextricably intertwined with the Nation’s economy . . . . These 
expenditures enable schools to provide a valuable service—namely, to equip 
students with the skills they need to survive in life and, more specifically, in the 
workplace.”); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (“The importance of 
public schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and 
in the preservation of the values on which our society rests, long has been 
recognized by our decisions . . . .”); Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (“[Education] is 
required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even 
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.”). 
23 The Supreme Court did not “foreclose the possibility ‘that some identifiable 
quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the 
meaningful exercise of either [the right to speak or the right to vote].’” Papasan, 
478 U.S. at 284 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
1, 36 (1973)). 
24 To view each state’s educational mandates, see Education - State Laws, LEGAL 
INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/table_education 
[https://perma.cc/8HUV-FXWX]. 
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sciences, and all seminaries of them; . . . to countenance and 
inculcate the principles of humanity and general benevolence, 
public and private charity, industry and frugality, honesty and 
punctuality in their dealings; sincerity, good humor, and all social 
affections, and generous sentiments among the people.25 
This clause has been interpreted by the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court to mean that the Commonwealth has a duty to provide 
its citizens with more than mere access to an education; it must furnish 
them with an “adequate” level of education in the pursuit of an 
enlightened and just citizenry.26 Other states’ constitutions are far less 
prescriptive in their imposition of a duty to provide an equitable, 
adequate, and accountable education to their citizens.27 Massachusetts 
 
25 MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2. 
26 Doe v. Sec’y of Educ., 95 N.E.3d 241, 253 (Mass. 2018). Education is a means 
to the following ends: 
(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable 
students to function in a complex and rapidly changing 
civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and 
political systems to enable students to make informed choices; (iii) 
sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the 
student to understand the issues that affect his or her community, 
state, and nation . . . . 
 Id. at 253 n.23 (quoting McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 
N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993)). 
27 Legal scholar William E. Thro uses a system of categorization to identify the 
disparate duties of states’ educational obligations in their constitutions. William 
E. Thro, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions 
in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639, 1661–68 
(1989). While Thro’s analysis was done in the light of financial obligations 
owed by the states, it is applicable to this discussion as well: “Category I 
education clauses provide for a system of free public schools and nothing 
more . . . .” Id. at 1662 (footnote omitted). “Category II education clauses . . . 
mandate . . . a certain minimum standard of quality . . . .” Id. at 1663 (footnote 
omitted). “Category III education clauses [provide] . . . ‘stronger and more 
specific education mandate[s]’ and ‘purposive preambles.’” Id. at 1668 
(footnotes omitted). “Category IV clauses impose the greatest obligation . . . . 
Typically, they provide that education is ‘fundamental,’ ‘primary,’ or 
‘paramount.’” Id. at 1667–68 (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. 11, 
§ 1 (as a Category I clause: “The legislature shall provide for the maintenance 
and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this 
state may be educated.”). It is worth noting that the New York Assembly has 
pending legislation that would propel this provision to a Category II: “The 
legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free and 
quality education from prekindergarten through the undergraduate degrees or 
certification programs offered in post secondary schools, wherein all pupils of 
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has been the legal “tip of the spear” on many social issues. In an 
August 28th statement, Senator Edward Markey described 
Massachusetts as being “at the forefront of the challenges of our time 
— universal health care [and] same sex marriage . . . .”28 Why then 
should a right to literacy not begin at the state level, where the first 
educational laws were passed? Historically, it has been at the state 
level where other social norms have bloomed from state-based policy 
into a national discourse—why should a right to literacy not take this 
same path? 
 
B. Literacy and Freedom of Expression 
The First Amendment “was fashioned to assure unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social 
changes desired by the people.”29 It “rests on the assumption that the 
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free 
press is a condition of a free society.”30 The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly reaffirmed the need for unfettered access to manifestations 
of “press.”31 These rights regarding unfettered distribution of 
information, however, are only one side of the story.32 There must be 
someone on the other side to receive the information, because there 
can be no true exchange without mutual give and take.33 
 
this state may be educated.” 2019 N.Y. Assemb. B. No. 8738, 242d Leg. Sess. 
(N.Y. 2019) (emphasis added). 
28 Chris Lisinski, As Kennedy Considers Run, Markey Touts Endorsements of 116 
Lawmakers, TAUNTON DAILY GAZETTE (Aug. 27, 2019, 6:20 PM), 
https://www.tauntongazette.com/news/20190827/as-kennedy-considers-run-
markey-touts-endorsements-of-116-lawmakers [https://perma.cc/Z2HJ-AD4A] 
(last updated Aug 28, 2019, 11:34 AM). 
29 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
30 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). 
31 See Virgina State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 755–57 (1976) (discussing the right to receive commercial 
advertising); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305–07 (1965) 
(discussing the right to receive foreign political publications). 
32 See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 763–64 (1972). “It is now well 
established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and 
ideas. ‘This freedom (of speech and press) . . . necessarily protects the right to 
receive.’” Id. at 762–63 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)). 
33 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756 (“Freedom of speech 
presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists, as is the case here, 
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In order to have a true and meaningful exercise of speech and 
press, the exchange of information must be received by a populous that 
can interpret, decipher, and understand the information it is 
receiving.34 
Education directly affects the ability of a child to exercise his First 
Amendment rights, both as a source and as a receiver of 
information and ideas, whatever interests he may pursue in 
life . . . . The opportunity for formal education . . . . may enhance 
the individual’s enjoyment of those rights . . . . Thus . . . “the 
pivotal position of education to success in American society and its 
essential role in opening up to the individual the central 
experiences of our culture lend it an importance that is 
undeniable.”35 
A people denied an affirmative right to literacy are curtailed from 
freely and fully exercising their First Amendment rights and will be 
stunted in their ability to participate in our democratic society.36 
 
C. Literacy and the Right to Exercise Political Will 
There can be no question that there is “a constitutionally protected 
right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in 
the jurisdiction.”37 That “right to vote in federal elections is conferred 
by Art. I, s 2, and the Seventeenth Amendment of the Constitution, and 
access to the state franchise has been afforded special protection 
because it is ‘preservative of other basic civil and political rights.’”38 
 
the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its 
recipients both.”). 
34 UNESCO, THE PLURALITY OF LITERACY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICIES 
AND PROGRAMMES 13 (2004), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001362/ 
136246e.pdf [https://perma.cc/BEE4-4QM3]. 
35 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 112–13 (1973) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Note, Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 
1065, 1129 (1969)). 
36 See generally Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A 
Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1, 47 (2004). In his discussion of the evolution of free speech in the digital 
age, Balkin addresses the importance of participating in a democracy, through 
“interactivity, mass participation, and the ability to modify and transform 
culture.” Id. at 1. He points to education as one of the ways in which a 
democracy “promote[s] free speech values.” Id. at 47. 
37 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972). 
38 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 114 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)). 
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In order to have meaningful participation in the political process, 
access to the participation must be free from prohibitive barriers.39 
Illiteracy can bar meaningful participation in the political process 
in two ways. First, ballots are written documents that must be read—a 
person who cannot read or understand the ballot cannot meaningfully 
participate in the political process.40 Second, just as illiteracy hampers 
engagement in First Amendment expression, so too does it bar “the 
free discussion of governmental affairs.”41 In order to have meaningful 
participation in the political process, “voters must be free to obtain 
information from diverse sources in order to determine how to cast 
their votes.”42 For these reasons, it is essential that voters are equipped 
to make an intelligent decision in the ballot box.43 
 
D. Opposition to Literacy as a Right 
Historically, education has been a function of the state and the 
Supreme Court has been unwilling to expand the reach of the federal 
government into local matters.44 “[T]he ultimate solutions must come 
from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those who 
elect them.”45 Those who oppose the idea of literacy as a fundamental 
right generally also oppose the idea of judicially-created rights and the 
recognition of positive rights outside of those enumerated in the 
Constitution.46 
 
39 See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant 
Rights and Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary, 572 U.S. 291, 368 (2014) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
40 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36 (“[A] voter cannot cast his ballot intelligently 
unless his reading skills and thought processes have been adequately 
developed.”). 
41 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). 
42 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010). 
43 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 113–14. (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
44 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979). “Today, education is perhaps the 
most important function of state and local governments.” Id. (quoting Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 
(1974) (“No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local 
control over the operation of schools . . . .”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 564 (1995) (stating that education is an area where states have historically 
been sovereign). 
45 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 59. 
46 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195–
96 (1989) (declining to hold that the Due Process Clause grants an affirmative 
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This federalist argument for a more restricted role of the federal 
judiciary is as old as the country itself.47 It contends that judges are not 
the best vehicle for implementing social change, especially in regards 
to something as intricate and state/municipality-specific as education 
and literacy.48 “The central insight of Rodriguez is that ‘the Justices of 
this Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local 
problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to 
the raising and disposition of public revenues.’”49 This line of thought 
additionally discourages the Court against interceding into political 
theater by creating policy.50 “The greatest threat to judicial 
independence occurs when the courts flout the basis for their 
independence by exceeding their constitutionally limited role and the 
bounds of their expertise by engaging in policymaking committed to 
the elected branches or the states.”51 When taken in the context of this 
Note, the Constitution does not provide for a positive right to either 
education or literacy.52 “Not even the broadest reading of the due 
 
right to governmental aid); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317–18 (1980) 
(“Although the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords protection 
against unwarranted government interference . . . it does not confer an 
entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of 
that freedom.”); Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344, 364 (E.D. Mich. 2018) 
(“Even when the Supreme Court has ventured to recognize a right as 
fundamental, it has typically limited them to ‘negative rights’ . . . .”). See also 
John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 
1219, 1221 (1993) (arguing that a disciplined approach to standing is one 
example of “judicial self-restraint”). 
47 See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
48 Greg Weiner, Literacy Is a Good, Not a Right, LAW & LIBERTY (July 11, 2018), 
https://www.lawliberty.org/2018/07/11/literacy-is-a-good-not-a-right/ 
[https://perma.cc/7KDJ-E43Z]. 
49 Millhiser, supra note 21, at 407 (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 41). 
50 Weiner, supra note 48. 
51 John G. Roberts, Jr., Draft Article on Judicial Restraint 3 (undated) (on file with 
the National Archives and Records Administration), https://www.archives.gov/ 
files/news/john-roberts/accession-60-89-0372/doc006.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
6UZH-MTAV]. “A second means by which courts arrogate to themselves 
functions reserved to the legislative branch or the states is through so-called 
‘fundamental rights’ and ‘suspect class’ analyses, both of which invite broad 
judicial scrutiny of the essentially legislative task of classification.” Id. at 4. 
52 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). See Gary B. 
v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344, 363 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (“The Court is left to 
conclude that the Supreme Court has neither confirmed nor denied that access to 
literacy is a fundamental right.”). In Gary B., the district court concluded that 
the Due Process Clause does not demand a State to affirmatively provide a right 
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process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment can 
establish a right to literacy . . . . [T]here is no case under the federal 
constitution here.”53 Essentially, this policy of judicial restraint boils 
down to a basic proposition: just because something is “stupid” does 
not mean that it is unconstitutional.54 Inversely, a valid and desirable 
social good does not make it a fundamental right. 
 
E. Literacy is Testable, Justiciable, & Remediable 
Countering the argument against judicial recognition of a right to 
literacy is the important consideration that courts have adequate 
measuring and remedying tools at their disposal to decide an issue. 
The evolution of the national education system, the introduction of 
federal and state testing, and additional mandated standards make it 
entirely possible today.55 Without the data that is available today, 
plaintiffs had no ability to demonstrate to courts how much education 
 
to literacy. Id. at 366; see also Roberts, supra note 51, at 5 (“When confronting 
constitutional problems in the context of the administration of state institutions 
[like schools], courts must be particularly cognizant of their lack of 
expertise . . . .”). 
53 Weiner, supra note 48. 
54 Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 4, 2013, 
http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/ 
[https://perma.cc/4BAW-EXQU]. See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
605 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). “[T]he law before the Court today ‘is . . . 
uncommonly silly.’ If I were a member of the Texas Legislature, I would vote to 
repeal [the law punishing same sex activity] . . . . Notwithstanding this, I 
recognize that as a Member of this Court I am not empowered to help petitioners 
and others similarly situated.” Id. (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 
479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting)); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 507 (Black, J., 
dissenting) (“I do not . . . base my view that this . . . law is constitutional on a 
belief that [it] is wise or that its policy is a good one . . . . [T]he law is every bit 
as offensive to me as it is my Brethren of the majority . . . .”). 
55 See generally No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 
1425 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) (requiring state-
mandated expansion of standardized testing for primary school students); DAVID 
P. GARDNER ET AL., NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT 
RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983), 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED226006.pdf [https://perma.cc/764H-ZA2Q] 
(advocating for the expansion of standardized testing at the primary and 
secondary school levels); History of Standardized Testing in the United States, 
NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, http://www.nea.org/home/66139.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
H4LU-ZPW2] (describing standardized testing’s now-widespread application) 
[hereinafter History of Standardized Testing]. 
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was required for students to fully exercise constitutional rights. 
Similarly, data could not illustrate the level of education required to 
effectively participate in the political process, or furthermore, to assess 
what schools did or did not do to meet a minimum bar—because that 
data was non-existent. 
When Rodriguez was decided in 1964, there were little to no 
nation-wide assessment tools and (rightfully, or not) the courts would 
have been ill-equipped to find a remedy or baseline for a literacy test.56 
Today, there are multiple literacy assessment tools which are 
supported by pedagogy and utilized nationally. The Flesch-Kincaid 
reading assessment was developed in the 1970s by J. Peter Kincaid.57 
It is widely used by state and federal agencies to ensure that important 
official documents are accessible, via their readability, to their 
citizens.58 Additionally, the Lexile Framework is a linguistic-based 
assessment that is currently used in every state to measure reading 
standards set by the federally initiated ‘Common Core’ requirements.59 
Moreover, twenty-five states report Lexile measures on their year-end 
assessments.60 
The academic literature strongly supports the validity of the 
methods used by assessments like Flesch-Kincaid and Lexile.61 Their 
use by government agencies and their reliance by educators throughout 
the country could provide reliable methods to the courts for assessing 
and quantifying what specific levels of literacy are necessary to be 
able to understand any given text. With national and state reliance on 
standardized testing, courts also have usable and persuasive data to 
 
56 History of Standardized Testing, supra note 55. 
57 WILLIAM DUBAY, THE PRINCIPLES OF READABILITY 21–22 (2004), https:// 
files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED490073.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FEK-9J2M]. 
Kincaid’s reading grade level assessment was designed to measure the grade-
level readability of technical materials for the U.S. Navy. Id. 
58 See, e.g., Readable Language in Insurance Policies, FLA. STAT. § 627.4145(1)(a) 
(2003). 




61 See generally Sheida White & John Clement, Assessing the Lexile Framework: 
Results of a Panel Meeting (Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Working Paper No. 
2001-08, 2001), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2001/200108.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
U5BG-AZU3]. 
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determine whether certain students, schools, municipalities, or states 
are attaining the appropriate level of literacy.62 
II. INCREMENTALISM 
A. Background & Theory 
The incremental model is a policymaking process attributed to 
Yale University political scientist Charles Lindblom. According to 
Lindblom, policymakers work through a process of “continually 
building out from the current situation, step-by-step and by small 
degrees.”63 Alternatively, “[d]ecisions thus arrived at are usually only 
marginally different from those that exist; in other words, the changes 
from the status quo are incremental.”64 Before Lindblom, the 
prevailing notion of policymaking featured methodical attempts to 
achieve all-encompassing solutions by identifying all relevant 
objectives, ranking them, and then coming up with potential 
solutions.65 Policymakers would then compare every one of the policy 
alternatives, decide which best achieved the goals, and implement the 
viable policy.66 
Lindblom questioned the classic model of policymaking because 
he thought it relied upon unrealistic assumptions about our ability to 
analyze complex issues.67 While it may appear to be a theoretically 
rational approach, the classic model could never be applied to real-
world, complex problems.68 Even if decisionmakers could identify the 
myriad objectives and values to be considered, they would likely 
disagree about their relative importance and find conflicts and 
contradictions among them.69 Additionally, collecting and processing 
every effect of every possibility would be a herculean and impossible 
 
62 See supra text accompanying note 13. 
63 Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. 
REV. 79, 81 (1959). 
64 MICHAEL HOWLETT & M. RAMESH, STUDYING PUBLIC POLICY: POLICY CYCLES 
AND POLICY SUBSYSTEMS 142 (1995). 
65 Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” supra note 63, at 79. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 80. 
68 Charles E. Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 
517, 519 (1979). 
69 Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” supra note 63, at 81–82. 
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undertaking.70 The classic model “assumes intellectual capacities and 
sources of information” that we do not have.71 Lindblom recognized 
that the classic model of decision-making is impossible in practice and 
decreed that “every administrator faced with a sufficiently complex 
problem must find ways drastically to simplify.”72 
Under Lindblom’s theory, policymakers should institute policy in 
an incremental fashion—by “muddling through” as best they can.73 
Policy, according to Lindblom, “does not move in leaps and bounds,” 
but instead it morphs and evolves “almost entirely through incremental 
adjustments” being “made and re-made endlessly.”74 
Lindblom discussed incremental policymaking both descriptively 
and normatively. He asserted that it is actually how policy is 
implemented in the real world.75 Incrementalism breaks down large 
problems into more manageable tasks.76 It allows for gradual change 
with less risk, and allows for decentralized control which results in 
more grass-roots decision making over policy formation.77 
Incrementalism “will be superior to any other decision-making method 
available for complex problems in many circumstances, certainly 
superior to a futile attempt at superhuman comprehensiveness.”78 
The United States, given its pluralistic political and economic 
makeup amongst the hodgepodge of its states, is a pure reflection of 
the inevitability of Lindblom’s incrementalistic theory within a 
democracy.79 Accordingly, it is regarded “as the standard—indeed 
almost ubiquitous—mode of policy enactment in the United States.”80 
 
70 Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, supra note 68, at 518. 
71 Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” supra note 63, at 80. 
72 Id. at 84. 
73 Id. at 80–83; Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, supra note 68, at 517. 
74 Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” supra note 63, at 84, 86. 
75 Id. at 88. 
76 Id. at 85. 
77 Id. at 85–86. 
78 Id. at 88. 
79 Samuel Levey & James Hill, Universal Health Insurance: Incrementalism or 
Comprehensive Reform?, 3 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 189, 192 (1991). 
80 JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 9 (1984). 
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B. Opposition to Incrementalism as a Path Forward 
One argument that challenges the incrementalistic theory suggests 
that some policy should be done in a wholesale fashion.81 Jennifer 
Hochschild concluded that incrementalism was not an effective 
approach to desegregating public schools in the aftermath of Brown.82 
Rather than minimizing disruptions, building local support, and 
gaining flexibility to monitor and adapt, the incremental approach 
allowed for and even cultivated an opposition and resistance to 
integration.83 Its muddling approach created a sense of uncertainty and 
a lack of commitment, which in turn created resistance.84 Hochschild 
found that opposing forces could derail the local segregation progress 
if it was not implemented on the largest possible scale.85 
Hochschild further argued that incremental efforts to desegregate 
schools were more harmful than remaining with the status quo.86 
“[H]alfhearted, restricted, timid” incremental changes caused racial 
resentment, residential segregation, and decreased minority self-
esteem and achievement.87 While an incrementalistic may view half 
measures as better than no measures, Hochschild surmised that this 
particular maxim may not have been true when it came to 
desegregation.88 
 
C. Examples of Incremental Policymaking 
1. Marriage Equality 
Marriage equality, which began at a point of illegality, has faced a 
steeper and more challenging path than the process of literacy as a 
fundamental right ever will.89 A complete history of legalized 
 
81 For purposes of this article, wholesale change refers to a nationwide mandate 
and incremental change concerns a state by state approach to adopting literacy 
as a right. 
82 HOCHSCHILD, supra note 80, at 11–12. 
83 Id. at 46–48. 
84 Id. at 46–54 (explaining districts that went through fast change had greater 
success than those that took small steps over a longer period). 
85 Id. at 54–70. 
86 Id. at 91. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Juxtaposing the “starting points” of the two issues. Illegality of same sex 
marriage in DOMA vs. a ‘social good’ is not necessarily a right. 
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persecution and discrimination faced by same-sex couples is beyond 
the scope of this article, however a brief understanding of the how the 
United States went from The Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”)90 to 
Obergefell v. Hodges is useful.91 
One of the first steps towards the path to marriage equality taken in 
the aftermath of DOMA was the Supreme Court of Vermont’s decision 
in Baker v. State, which held that the exclusion of same-sex couples 
from constitutional protection was illegal.92 The Baker Court, while 
not granting any positive rights, declared that same-sex couples were 
“entitled . . . to obtain the same benefits and protections afforded by 
Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples.”93 Following the Baker 
Court’s suggestion that it lay within the “prerogatives of the 
Legislature” to suitably remedy the problem,94 the Vermont 
legislature, in 2000, passed the first-in-the-nation state law allowing 
for civil unions for same-sex couples.95 After eight years of state-
endorsed civil unions, however, the Vermont legislature’s Commission 
on Family Recognition and Protection detailed significant disparities 
and inequities in civil unions compared to marriage.96 In 2009, the 
Marriage Equality Act became law and defined marriage as between 
“two people” as opposed to between a man and a woman.97 
Massachusetts took a different approach to the DOMA-reality. It 
judicially recognized marriage equality in the courts, rather than the 
legislature, in the case of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.98 
Unlike the court in Vermont, the Massachusetts Justices of the 
Supreme Judicial Court did not pass on the opportunity to create law 
 
90 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012) (defining marriage for federal 
purposes as between a man and a woman and permitting states to refuse to 
recognize same-sex marriages legally granted by other states), invalidated by 
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
91 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
92 744 A.2d 864, 866 (Vt. 1999). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 See Jill Jourdan, The Effects of Civil Unions on Vermont Children, 28 VT. B.J. 
32, 32 (2002). 
96 THE OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE VERMONT COMMISSION 
ON FAMILY RECOGNITION AND PROTECTION 26–27 (2008), http://www.leg. 
state.vt.us/WorkGroups/FamilyCommission/VCFRP_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3NPD-VRLQ]. 
97 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (West 2009). 
98 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
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defining marriage.99 The decision in Goodridge established marriage 
as between “two persons” because “barring an individual from the 
protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because 
that person would marry a person of the same sex violates the 
Massachusetts Constitution.”100 The decision in Goodridge, and its 
implementation as law in 2004, made Massachusetts the first state to 
recognize marriage equality. 
Following Goodridge, the Massachusetts legislature proposed a 
bill that would create civil unions for same sex couples that would 
allow them to “obtain the legal protections, benefits, rights and 
responsibilities associated with civil marriage, while preserving the 
traditional, historic nature and meaning of the institution of civil 
marriage.”101 The legislature submitted this bill to the Supreme 
Judicial Court for an Advisory Opinion, fearing “grave doubt as to the 
constitutionality” of whether marriage exclusively reserved for 
opposite sex couples and a separate caste of relationship available for 
same sex couples would pass muster.102 In its opinion, the court 
soundly rejected the bill as unconstitutional.103 The court rejected the 
legislature’s attempt to make civil unions equal to marriage,104 which 
would have “relegate[d] same-sex couples to a different status.”105 To 
the court, it was more than a “semantic” argument: “[t]he dissimilitude 
between the terms ‘civil marriage’ and ‘civil union’ is not innocuous; 
it is a considered choice of language that reflects a demonstrable 
assigning of same-sex, largely homosexual, couples to second-class 
status.”106 In the court’s opinion, a civil union, even if 
indistinguishable from marriage, is decidedly unequal in the eyes of 
the law because its status as separate makes it decidedly not equal.107 
 
99 Id. at 969. 
100 Id. 
101 In re Ops. of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 568 (Mass. 2004) 
(quoting An Act Relative to Civil Unions, S. No. 2175, § 1). 
102 Id. at 566. 
103 Id. at 572. 
104 Id. at 568. 
105 Id. at 569. 
106 Id. at 570. 
107 Id. at 569 (“The history of our nation has demonstrated that separate is seldom, 
if ever, equal.”). 
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Other states also wrestled with the distinction between civil unions 
and marriage and the issues of definition and discrimination.108 
Suzanne Goldberg found that some states’ justifications for a “separate 
but equal”109 system of distinction were based on the history and 
tradition of marriage being between a man and a woman.110 She 
discussed Connecticut’s rationale as justifying “ongoing 
discrimination” by relying on “past practices.”111 The states of New 
Jersey and California similarly argued for keeping marriage between a 
man and a woman based on a historical narrative.112 
The Office of the Attorney General in Maryland researched the 
state by state approach taken in regards to marriage equality in 
2015.113 In the ten years since the decision in Goodridge, thirty-one 
states had prohibited gay marriage, either by statute or constitutional 
amendment.114 In the two years after the 2013 Windsor case held that 
DOMA’s definition of marriage was unconstitutional as a deprivation 
of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment,115 there 
had been a recent “encouraging trend” of states recognizing same-sex 
 
108 Suzanne B. Goldberg, Marriage as Monopoly: History, Tradition, 
Incrementalism, and the Marriage/Civil Union Distinction, 41 CONN. L. REV. 
1397, 1405 (2009). 
109 Id. at 1399. 
110 Id. at 1399–400. 
111 Id. at 1404. See also Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 414 
(Conn. 2008) (“The [State] also maintained that . . . since ancient times, 
marriage has been understood to be the union of a man and a woman, and . . . 
‘deeply rooted in this [n]ation’s history and tradition . . . .’” (quoting 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997))). 
112 Goldberg, supra note 108, at 1404–05. “New Jersey defended its marriage law 
in a similar way, ‘rest[ing] its case on age-old traditions, beliefs, and laws’ . . . .” 
Id. (quoting Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 206 (N.J. 2006)). “California 
likewise advanced the argument that . . . ‘the institution of marriage traditionally 
(both in California and throughout most of the world) has been limited to a 
union between a man and a woman.’” Id. (quoting In re Marriage Cases, 183 
P.3d 384, 447–48 (Cal. 2008)). 
113 MD. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., THE STATE OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY IN 
AMERICA (2015). This is nineteen years after DOMA, twelve years after 
Goodridge, and immediately preceding the Court’s decision in Obergefell. 
114 Id. at 1. Twenty-three of those state prohibitions took place within three years of 
the Goodridge decision. Id. at 8. 
115 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 769–71, 775 (2013). 
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marriage.116 In 2015, thirty-five states had recognized a right to 
marriage for same-sex couples.117 
This incremental trend toward equality resulted in a country that 
“look[ed] more like a checkerboard than one ‘Nation, one people.’”118 
The Maryland Report concluded that “[t]o ask families and children to 
wait their turn until democratic majorities in their respective states 
decide to recognize their inherent human dignity is simply to ask too 
much.”119 In 2015, the Supreme Court held that the patchwork of 
rights, due to “years of litigation, legislation, referenda, and the 
discussions that attended these public acts, [that left] States . . . divided 
on the issue of same-sex marriage” was not sustainable.120 
In extending the right to marry to same-sex couples, Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion used a four-prong approach of “principles and 
traditions” to validate the decision—only three of which are relevant to 
this discussion.121 First, the right is “inherent in the concept of 
individual autonomy” and therefore provides an avenue for other 
“freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality.”122 
Secondly, the right “safeguards children” by preventing them from 
feeling “the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser” 
through “harm and humiliat[ion].”123 Finally, the right “is a keystone 
of [the nation’s] social order.124 Throughout history, marriage has been 
“the foundation of the family and of society, without which there 
would be neither civilization nor progress”125 and “a great public 
institution, giving character to our whole civil polity”126 that 
 
116 MD. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 113, at 3. 
117 Id. Of the thirty-five, only eleven were done by statute and twenty-four had to be 
mandated by the courts. Id. 
118 Id. at 20 (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701, 868 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
119 Id. at 21. 
120 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015). 
121 Id. at 2599. The second of Justice Kennedy’s principles, justifying the right to 
marry “because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance 
to the committed individuals,” is not directly relevant to this discussion. Id. His 
other three principles can be better related to the topic of literacy as a 
fundamental right. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 2600–601. 
124 Id. at 2601. 
125 Id. (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)). 
126 Id. (quoting Maynard, 125 U.S. at 213). 
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“nourish[es] the union.”127 Putting such an emphasis on the “right by 
placing [it] at the center of so many facets of the legal and social 
order,” Justice Kennedy concluded that the states themselves had 
bestowed upon it a “fundamental character” which cannot then be 
denied to its citizens.128 
The incremental path taken by marriage equality has been studied 
and written about extensively.129 The research conducted by Kees 
Waaldijk, William N. Eskridge, and Yuval Merin on the “theory of 
small change”130 thoroughly examines the “evolutionary staircase with 
relatively specific steps” that has culminated in a national recognition 
of marriage equality for same-sex couples.131 Their phased approach 
reflects a three-step, incremental approach to marriage equality: “(1) 
the decriminalization of consensual same-sex intimacy occurs first; (2) 
then anti-discrimination against sexual minorities is furthered; and (3) 
lastly, the relationships of same-sex couples are then legally 
recognized.”132 This incremental approach thrust the issue into the 
national spotlight. Yet by first normalizing the subject at the state 
level, “a great change” was prevented at the outset on the federal level, 
which “show[ed] the public that their fears about same-sex partnership 
and its potential negative effects on society [were] groundless.”133 
While there is still work to be done to guarantee lasting marriage 
equality rights, the incremental theory does provide a “helpful guide” 
to show how marriage equality grew from illegal, to a patch-work of 
legality, to normative action at the federal level.134 
 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 2601. 
129 See generally Goldberg, supra note 108, at 1422–23 (attacking state invocation 
of incrementalism to justify the slow redressing of inequality); Jeremiah A. Ho, 
Weather Permitting: Incrementalism, Animus, and the Art of Forecasting 
Marriage Equality After U.S. v. Windsor, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (2014) (tracing 
the incremental steps that softened regulations as applicable to sexual minorities 
particularly given the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor) [hereinafter Ho, 
Weather Permitting]. 
130 Erez Aloni, Incrementalism, Civil Unions, and the Possibility of Predicting 
Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 105, 
107 (2010). 
131 Ho, Weather Permitting, supra note 129, at 7. 
132 Id. 
133 Aloni, supra note 130, at 107–08. 
134 Ho, Weather Permitting, supra note 129, at 10; see also Jeremiah A. Ho, Once 
We’re Done Honeymooning: Obergefell v. Hodges, Incrementalism, and 
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2. Marijuana Legalization 
Another example of subject matter being thrust into the national 
spotlight through an incremental state-by-state approach is that of the 
legalization of marijuana.135 This ongoing issue, while less settled than 
that of same-sex marriage, is nonetheless relevant to the discussion 
here. Specifically, its path from illegality to state-by-state forms of 
legality to the forecast of a potential legal national acceptance.136 
Federally, cannabis has been classified as a Schedule I drug since 
the passage of the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) in 1970.137 The 
CSA made it illegal to grow, buy, or use marijuana (in any form), with 
no exception for medical use.138 From 1970-2009 there was little 
movement at the federal level concerning marijuana.139 In 2009, the 
Ogden Memo was released, softening the federal priority of 
enforcement and policing as it related to state laws regulating medical 
marijuana.140 In 2014, the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment prohibited 
the Justice Department from interfering with the implementation of 
state medical cannabis laws.141 Congress is currently debating 
 
Advances for Sexual Orientation Anti-Discrimination, 104 KY. L.J. 207, 212 
(2015). 
135 See Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 
Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 100–02 (2015). This Note is not intended to 
be an in-depth analysis of marijuana laws. For simplicity’s sake, this Note will 
be using “marijuana” and “cannabis” interchangeably. 
136 Similar to the previous analysis of marriage equality, this Note is simply 
providing an annotated history of a longer journey. 
137 Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236, 1249 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 812 (c)(c)(10) (2018)). 
138 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(b)(1), 812(c)(c)(10) (2018). 
139 See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 135, at 84–87. 
140 Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to selected U.S. Attorneys (Oct. 19, 2009), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/memorandum-selected-united-state-
attorneys-investigations-and-prosecutions-states [https://perma.cc/G6AT-
MRZE]. The new policy directed federal prosecutors to “not focus federal 
resources in [their] States on individuals whose actions are in clear and 
unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for the medical use 
of marijuana.” Id. 
141 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 
§ 538, 128 Stat. 2130 (2014) (“None of the funds made available in this Act to 
the Department of Justice may be used . . . to prevent such States from 
implementing their own State laws that authorize the use, distribution, 
possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.”). 
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removing marijuana from the list of illicit substances enumerated in 
the CSA.142 
State-level response to the federal ban of marijuana in the CSA has 
varied, ranging from legal medical uses to decriminalization to 
recreational legalization.143 Beginning in 1996, states began to create 
their own policies for regulating marijuana, with California voters 
approving a state-wide referendum legalizing its use for medical 
purposes.144 In 2009, the year that the Ogden Memo was released, 
thirteen states allowed some form of legalized medical marijuana 
use.145 Today, more than half of the states and the District of Columbia 
have legalized medical marijuana, and eleven states and the District of 
Columbia have passed laws permitting its recreational use, with 
potentially more to come this year.146 
This slow burn to national legitimacy has created tremendous 
disparity in the enforcement of criminal, banking, and tax law, as well 
as in the expenditure of public resources compared to other crimes.147 
The conflict between the states and the federal law “despite the DOJ’s 
announced enforcement leniency . . . . significantly 
hampers . . . [b]anks, attorneys, insurance companies, potential 
investors, and others—justifiably concerned about breaking federal 
law . . . .”148 Federally regulated banks are hesitant to do business with 
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state-legitimized marijuana businesses for fear of federal 
prosecution.149 Federal tax law makes it “disadvantageous” to run a 
legitimate business if it violates federal drug law.150 
The issues raised due to the current disparate nature of the 
marijuana situation have perhaps come to an unsustainable head.151 It 
can be argued that the theory of incrementalism, as it pertains to the 
national legalization of marijuana, is working.152 “Today, the states 
that have legalized marijuana are conducting a once-in-a-generation 
pressure test on the bounds of democratic experimentation permitted 
within our constitutional structure.”153 There are different states with 
different laws, some of which are in compliance with federal law and 
some of which are not.154 The state-driven drive to legalization has 
made this a national concern while its local roots have resulted in a 
feeling by Americans that the issue is already moot.155 “Marijuana 
legalization is very popular nationwide . . . . That’s 
emboldening . . . lawmakers to take the issue far more seriously than in 
years past.”156 By breaking the national problem into state issues, 
allowing states to experiment (to see what works and what does not), 
and by giving local governments control of a traditionally local issue, 
 
the tightrope that employers and employees may have to walk, balancing 
disparate federal and state regulations). 
149 Chemerinsky et al., supra note 135, at 91. 
150 Id. at 94. 
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152 See generally Mandiberg, supra note 143, at 826 (arguing that a “one-size-fits-
all” approach is ill-suited for marijuana legalization). 
153 Brian M. Blumenfeld, State Legalization of Marijuana and Our American 
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& L. 77, 96 (2017). 
154 See id. at 79; Chemerinsky et al., supra note 135, at 90; Mandiberg, supra note 
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(Jan. 23, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/ 
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[https://perma.cc/KW36-XU24] [hereinafter Lopez, Marijuana Legalization]. 
See also McNamara, These States Now Have Legal Weed, supra note 146 
(“[S]upport for legal pot hit a new high in 2019, with 65% of U.S. adults saying 
marijuana should be legal.”). 
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the legalization of marijuana has forced the issue into the national 
spotlight where it must be dealt with.157 
III. AN INCREMENTAL PATH FOR LITERACY 
A. Rejection from the Courts Is a Blessing 
In the 1982 case of Plyler v. Doe, the Court found that a Texas law 
unconstitutionally withheld funds for the education of undocumented 
immigrant children.158 The Court determined that the law’s restriction 
on the opportunity to receive an education violated the right to equal 
protection.159 While the Court fell short of declaring education a 
“fundamental right,” it emphasized its importance.160 Additionally, the 
Court spoke to the importance of literacy and its benefits: 
Illiteracy is an enduring disability. The inability to read and write 
will handicap the individual deprived of a basic education each and 
every day of his life. The inestimable toll of that deprivation on the 
social economic, intellectual, and psychological well-being of the 
individual, and the obstacle it poses to individual achievement, 
make it most difficult to reconcile the cost or the principle of a 
status-based denial of basic education with the framework of 
equality embodied in the Equal Protection Clause.161 
In Rodriguez, the Court appeared to reverse the course it had set 
with cases like Brown and Plyler when it held that a policy of school 
funding which unequally distributed resources and thereby affected the 
quality of education did not require strict scrutiny as there is no 
fundamental right to a well-financed education.162 In 1986, the Court 
reaffirmed the prior position it took in Rodriguez, “that education ‘is 
not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal 
Constitution.’”163 
 
157 See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 135, at 84–90; Mandiberg, supra note 143, at 
838–39. 
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163 Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 284 (1986) (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 
35). In Papasan, lands held in trust by the state were not being used for public 
schools, as was directed when the lands were granted to the state by the federal 
government. Id. at 274. Petitioners claimed that they were being denied an 
adequate education based on the state’s disproportionate distribution of state 
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Although the Court in Rodriguez and Papasan did not recognize 
education as a fundamental right, it did acknowledge that there may be 
“some identifiable quantum of education [that] is a constitutionally 
protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of [other] 
right[s] . . . .”164 Since the plaintiffs in Rodriguez and Papasan did not 
identify a failure to attain a specific “quantum of education” connected 
to the exercise of other constitutional rights, “no charge fairly could be 
made that the system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to 
acquire the basic minimum skills necessary for the enjoyment of the 
rights of speech and of full participation in the political process.”165 
 
B. The Status of the States 
Every state constitution includes at least one provision requiring 
the state to establish and support some type of public education 
system.166 Some contain several provisions concerning the 
establishment, administration, and funding of public schools; these 
state constitutional education provisions reflect different commitments 
about how to provide educational services.167 The language used by 
each state could dictate how easy it would be to establish a right to 
literacy within the respective state.168 Some constitutions require a 
state to provide a “[g]eneral and uniform” education, others mandate 
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that the education be “thorough and efficient.”169 Perhaps the states 
with language in their constitutions that envision “education as a 
democratic imperative” would be those most likely, either through 
their courts or legislatures, to implement literacy as a fundamental 
right.170 
 
C. Moving Forward by Taking Small Steps 
The incremental theory posits that most policy changes are likely 
to be small before any large change in policy can or will be realized.171 
This Note has demonstrated that the path to marriage equality and 
legalized marijuana has not been one nationally-sweeping change, but 
rather changes made state-by-state, until eventually change was 
realized in the larger system.172 Analogously, a similar path could, and 
should, be considered in the fight for literacy as a fundamental right. 
Rather than a national policy, where concerns of over-reaching can 
drag a debate into a quagmire, the incremental model makes more 
sense by allowing progress toward the ultimate goal: 
The incremental model views decision-making as a practical 
exercise concerned with solving problems at hand rather than 
achieving lofty goals. In this model the means chosen for solving 
problems are discovered through trial-and-error rather than through 
the comprehensive evaluation of all possible means. Decision-
makers consider only a few familiar alternatives for 
appropriateness and stop the search when they believe an 
acceptable alternative has been found.173 
Like the roads which led to marriage equality and marijuana 
legalization, a right to literacy must take small steps to ensure its 
foundation is secure before rising to the national level.174 First, any 
change must be small; there cannot be a major sea-change all at 
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once.175 Fortunately, there is already some duty of education owed by 
the states to their citizens and national standards of education, so 
adding a right to literacy would not be a dramatic shift from the status 
quo, both on the state and federal levels.176 Specifically, the standard 
set by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court could be viewed as 
simply a semantic degree of change from demanding a right to literacy 
in the Commonwealth: 
The Commonwealth’s duty requires the Commonwealth to have a 
State public education plan to ensure that our children are educated 
in a manner so that they possess capabilities that “accord with our 
Constitution’s emphasis on educating our children to become free 
citizens on whom the Commonwealth may rely” to ensure the 
functioning of our democracy and society.177 
It is also worthy to note that the authors of the Massachusetts 
Constitution were aware that changes may become necessary and 
included a mandate to evolve, so if something like literacy became a 
fundamental necessity, it could be mandated.178 If Massachusetts were 
to adopt a right to literacy, it would certainly pass Lindblom’s 
requirement of keeping the change small.179 
Second, normalizing literacy among the states would allow for 
local control and formation before rolling it out on a national level.180 
Adoption at the local level may “communicate to the federal 
government that the [policy] is not only workable but also 
beneficial . . . . Local initiatives . . . can offer potential benefits to the 
federal government in the form of direct evidence of both public 
opinion and the utility of [policies] not yet entered into law at the 
federal level.”181 If municipalities or states adopted a right to literacy, 
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the potential benefits of increased civic engagement and the failures of 
additional lawsuits or a lack of progress in literacy rates would be 
more apparent and easier to fix.182 This will minimize the risk of 
failure at the national level because of incrementalism’s ability to fail 
on a small scale limits its exposure in the grand scheme.183 
Finally, a gradual adoption by the states will allow its fundamental 
character184 to become normalized within the national 
consciousness.185 Similar to the decision in Obergefell, where the 
Court held that where the states had bestowed such importance on the 
fundamental nature of marriage that it could not be denied to certain 
classes, literacy is so important that its fundamental character must be 
recognized as a basic right for everyone.186 While it is unclear if a 
fundamental right to literacy has popular support, “[f]ew would deny 
the importance of literacy in this society or the advantages enjoyed by 
those with advanced skills.”187 And like marijuana legalization, 
literacy’s popular support is essential for its success in the incremental 
model.188 
The incremental model provides an explanation as to how state-by-
state acceptance, local restrictions and all, would be the best approach 
to put literacy on the national stage.189 
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NEXT TIME WON’T YOU SING WITH ME 
“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and 
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of 
the country.”190 While Justice Brandeis was not referring to 
incrementalism specifically, his federalist mantra has parallels in the 
theory. Literacy is undoubtedly a fundamental requirement for both the 
citizens and the nation. The historical evidence, after examining the 
importance that literacy plays in our society, is undeniable.191 The 
Court and Congress may have come close, but “close only counts in 
horseshoes and hand grenades.” The theory of incrementalism, as seen 
through example, offers a viable method to propel literacy as a 
fundamental right into the national zeitgeist—evolving from an idea 
into a patchwork of state laws that culminates in a national policy. 
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